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Irreparable Benefits 
 
The conventional approach to preliminary relief focuses on irreparable harm but 
neglects entirely irreparable benefits. That is hard to understand. Errant 
irreversible harms are important because they distort incentives and have lasting 
distributional consequences. But the same is true of errant irreversible gains. When 
a preliminary injunction wrongly issues, then, there are actually two distinct 
errors to count: the irreparable harm wrongly imposed on the nonmoving party, 
and the irreparable benefit wrongly enjoyed by the moving party. Similarly, when a 
preliminary injunction is wrongly denied, there are again two errors, not one: the 
irreparable harm wrongly imposed on the moving party, and the irreparable benefit 
errantly accorded the nonmoving party. The conventional approach to preliminary 
relief mistakenly accounts for only half the problem. 
I. Introduction 
In every jurisdiction, a motion for preliminary relief is evaluated in light of 
three main factors: (1) the likelihood that the requesting party will ultimately 
prevail on the merits; (2) the irreparable harm the requesting party will suffer if 
the injunction is wrongly denied; and (3) the irreparable harm the opposing 
party will suffer if the injunction wrongly issues.1 The idea is to account for and 
minimize irreversible court error. In a case where denial of the injunction would 
be irreversibly harmful and there is a real chance of wrongful denial, courts are 
more reluctant to deny. Conversely, if issuance poses the greater irreversible 
threat, courts are more reluctant to issue. The analysis is often cast in terms of a 
                                                 
1 See, e.g., Micro Signal Research, Inc. v. Otus, 417 F.3d 28, 31 (1st Cir 2005) (motion for 
preliminary relief evaluated based on “likelihood of success on the merits, irreparable injury 
absent relief, harm to the defendant if relief is granted, and any public interest considerations”); 
Federal Express Corp. v. Federal Espresso, Inc., 201 F.3d 168, 173 (2d Cir 2000) (“a party seeking a 
preliminary injunction must demonstrate (1) the likelihood of irreparable injury in the absence of 
such an injunction, and (2) either (a) likelihood of success on the merits or (b) sufficiently serious 
questions going to the merits to make them a fair ground for litigation plus a balance of 
hardships tipping decidedly toward the party requesting the preliminary relief”). In some 
jurisdictions, additional factors are considered, but the focus remains on these three 
considerations. See, e.g., Roland Mach. Co. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 749 F.2d 380, 382-83 (7th Cir. 
1984) (considering whether the proposed injunction will protect or harm the public interest); 
Chathas v. Local 134 IBEW, 233 F.3d 508, 513 (7th Cir. 2000) (discussing the importance of 
preserving the status quo). 
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sliding scale: “the more likely it is the plaintiff will succeed on the merits, the less 
the balance of irreparable harms need weigh towards its side.”2 
This standard approach accounts for irreparable harms but neglects entirely 
irreparable benefits. That is hard to understand. If the goal is to minimize 
deviations from what will be the ultimate ruling on the merits,3 errant 
irreversible gains can be just as troubling as errant irreversible losses. Both can 
have lasting distributional implications, and both can distort important 
incentives like the incentive to sue or settle. When an injunction wrongly issues, 
then, there are actually two errors to count: the irreparable harm wrongfully 
imposed on the nonmoving party and the irreparable benefit mistakenly 
conferred on the moving party. Similarly, when an injunction is wrongly denied, 
there are again two errors: the irreparable harm wrongfully suffered by the 
moving party and the irreparable benefit inadvertently accorded the nonmoving 
party. 
Consider a simple example, one designed in particular to respond to the 
obvious criticisms that “irreparable benefits” is mere semantics and that this 
approach double-counts the same underlying wrong. Suppose that the plaintiff 
in a given case holds a patent on a chemical process shown to significantly 
reduce the rate of genetic mutation in a certain type of animal cell. The process at 
the moment has no specific medical application in humans, but the plaintiff 
believes that the process will ultimately mature into an important human 
therapy. The defendant, meanwhile, recently began work on a similar chemical 
process, also hoping in the end to find applications related to human ailments. 
The plaintiff’s legal allegation is that the defendant’s process infringes the patent 
and the defendant therefore should not be permitted to engage in further 
research without permission. The defendant’s response is that its research is 
permissible, either because its process does not fall within the scope of the 
patent’s claims or because the patent is invalid in light of the prior art. 
                                                 
2 Abbott Labs v. Mead Johnson & Co., 971 F.2d 6, 12 (7th Cir. 1992). 
3 Minimizing error costs is the goal according to virtually every scholarly and judicial account. 
See, e.g., John Leubsdorf, The Standard for Preliminary Injunctions, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 525 (1978) 
(arguing that the standard for preliminary relief is best understood as an attempt to minimize 
expected error); American Hospital Supply Corp. v. Hospital Products Ltd., 780 F.2d 589 (7th Cir. 
1986) (Posner, J.) (formalizing and adopting Leubsdorf’s reasoning). It is worth pointing out that 
other goals are also plausible. For example, the standard might endeavor to encourage 
settlement, or to clearly signal to the parties the most likely outcome on the merits. 
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If the patentee moves for preliminary relief,4 the first hurdle will be to show 
that something irreparable is at stake. Patent harms are not literally irreparable—
most patent-related injuries can be fully compensated by some ex post cash 
payment—but they are typically deemed irreparable because patent harms are 
difficult for courts to value.5 I will say more about this argument later,6 but for 
now note that many “irreparable” harms are actually irreparable only in this 
limited sense. Bankruptcy is widely considered to be an irreparable harm,7 even 
though in most instances there is some amount of cash that would fully soothe 
the wound. Similarly, restraints on employment are regularly categorized as 
irreparable,8  although here again there surely is some amount of cash that would 
make whole a wrongfully restrained worker. 
With irreparable harm shown, the next step in the analysis is to apply the 
three classic factors and therefore to consider: (1) the likelihood that the 
plaintiff’s patent is valid and infringed; (2) the irreparable harm that would be 
imposed on the defendant by a wrongful court order to halt its research; and (3) 
the irreparable harm that would be imposed on the plaintiff were the court to 
wrongfully deny relief. The first factor requires little explanation. If the plaintiff’s 
                                                 
4 It might not be in the patent holder’s interest to request preliminary relief. One reason is that, 
if the defendant’s infringement is later shown to be willful, the patent holder might be able to 
collect treble damages for these bad acts. A second reason is that a patentee who requests 
preliminary relief might have to agree to allow the accused infringer accelerated discovery. 
5 For many years, patent harms were presumed to be irreparable without the need for any 
additional specific showing with respect to the inadequacy of ex post cash damages. See, e.g., 
H.H. Robertson Co. v. United Steel Deck, 820 F.2d 384, 390 (Fed Cir. 1987). Today, courts seem 
more willing to inquire as to whether cash damages might suffice, for example refusing to 
recognize patent harms as irreparable in cases where the patentee has licensed the relevant patent 
to other parties and thereby implicitly established an approximate royalty rate. See, e.g., Finisar 
Corp. v. DirecTV Group, Inc., Civil Action No. 1:05-CV-264 (E.D. Tx 2006) (denying request for 
injunctive relief on these facts). 
6 And have before. See Doug Lichtman, Uncertainty and the Standard for Preliminary Relief, 
70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 197, 200-202 (2003) (arguing that valuation difficulties are the main reason why 
courts authorize preliminary relief). 
7 See, e.g., Young v. Ballis, 762 F. Supp. 823, 827 (S.D. Ind. 1990) (injunction may issue if 
"necessary to save a plaintiff's business from insolvency"); Roland Mach. v. Dresser Ind., 749 F.2d 
380, 386 (7th Cir. 1984) (Posner, J.)  (same if plaintiff “may go broke while waiting, or may have to 
shut down his business but without declaring bankruptcy”). 
8 See, e.g., MacGinnitie v. Hobbs Group, 420 F.3d 1234, 1242 (11th Cir. 2005) (“MacGinnitie has 
shown irreparable harm which cannot be undone through monetary remedies, in the form of 
unenforceable restrictions on his access to customers, employees, and information. These injuries 
are in the form of lost opportunities, which are difficult, if not impossible, to quantify.”). 
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case is a slam-dunk, the injunction should issue immediately, regardless of the 
relative irreparable implications. Conversely, if the plaintiff’s allegations are 
preposterous, no injunction should issue, again regardless of the irreparable 
consequences. Both of these conclusions follow from the simple fact that 
preliminary relief is not meant to contradict the outcome on the merits. If the 
merits are clear, the court’s decision with respect to preliminary relief is also 
clear, and irreparable consequences are utterly irrelevant. 
Things are more interesting in cases where the merits are murky, because in 
those cases a court must confront the possibility that its ruling with respect to 
preliminary relief might ultimately turn out to favor the wrong party. This is 
where the standard for preliminary relief does its heavy lifting. Start with the 
possibility that the court will refuse to issue the injunction at the preliminary 
stage but then, after a full hearing on the merits, conclude that the defendant’s 
research did in fact infringe. As the traditional analysis suggests, one cost 
associated with this errant denial is any irreparable harm that might be suffered 
by the patentee. This is a private cost suffered by the complaining patent holder, 
but it is also a social cost in that mistakes like this will over the long run dampen 
the ex ante incentive to pursue patent-eligible research, discourage patent 
holders from litigating even valid claims, and likely drive inventors to invest 
more heavily in costly self-help protections.9 
There is another cost associated with this errant refusal to enjoin, however, 
and that is the irreparable benefit that accrues to the infringer. This cost is one 
that the traditional analysis overlooks, yet—like the irreparable harm normally 
considered—it, too, has unintended private and social consequences. 
Undeserved irreversible gains skew the defendant’s incentives with respect to 
the question of whether to litigate or settle. They also encourage the defendant to 
invest further in his research, a wasteful outcome in cases where that research 
will ultimately turn out to be impermissible. Most importantly, undeserved 
irreversible gains undermine the defendant’s incentive to “invent around” the 
patent rather than infringing it. This latter implication is of particular 
consequence given that the patent system is designed to encourage innovation 
not merely by rewarding patent holders for their accomplishments but also by 
                                                 
9 Dick Posner and Bill Landes have argued that discouraging self-help of this sort is patent 
law’s most important purpose. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economic 
Structure of Intellectual Property Law 354 (2003). 
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forcing rivals to discover comparable, non-infringing substitutes for patented 
inventions.10 
Turn now to the opposite category of court error, namely an instance where 
the court issues an injunction at the preliminary stage but then, after a full 
hearing on the merits, concludes that the accused research was in fact 
permissible. The traditional analysis focuses exclusively on the irreparable harm 
suffered by the defendant because of the wrongful injunction. My point, 
predictable at this stage, is that similar private and social concerns arise with 
respect to the plaintiff’s wrongful and irreversible gains. Thus, the traditional 
approach recognizes that it is important to avoid a wrongful injunction in this 
setting because a wrongful injunction might irreversibly harm the defendant in a 
distribution sense and might skew long-run incentives like the incentive to 
pursue borderline but ultimately permissible research. The traditional approach 
overlooks, however, that wrongful injunctions are in addition troubling because 
they might irreversibly benefit the plaintiff in a distributional sense and might 
skew long-run incentives relevant to patentees, such as the incentive for a patent 
holder to litigate a case that is questionable on the merits. 
Naturally, there is much more to say on all of these topics. For instance, there 
are interactions among the various long-run incentives I consider above, and 
those interactions amplify some concerns but mitigate others. Moreover, the 
concept of irreparability is actually significantly more complicated than I have 
thus far let on; some errors, for example, turn out to be irreversible when they 
manifest themselves as undeserved losses but fully reversible when they 
manifest themselves as unearned gains. For now, however, I want to stake out 
only a very basic claim: When evaluating a motion for preliminary relief, any 
deviation from what will be the ultimate resolution on the merits is relevant, no 
matter whether that deviation is perceived to be a benefit or a harm. All that 
matters is that the deviation is unintended and that its consequences are difficult 
for a court to later reverse. 
I proceed as follows. In Part II, I explain what it means to say that a given 
harm or benefit is irreparable, and I explain why irreparability is thought to 
justify preliminary relief. My purpose here is to show that irreparable benefits 
are not so different from irreparable harms. Both matter because they threaten to 
lock in outcomes that are inconsistent with the outcomes that will be deemed 
                                                 
10 See Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1520 (Fed. Cir. 1995) 
(inventing around is “one of the important public benefits that justify awarding the patent owner 
exclusive rights to his invention”); State Indus., Inc. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 751 F.2d 1226, 1235-36 
(Fed. Cir. 1985) (inventing around "brings a steady flow of innovations to the marketplace"). 
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appropriate after a full hearing on the merits. In Part III, I consider the logic of 
the current standard for preliminary relief and explain how it could be adjusted 
to account for irreparable benefits. I emphasize here that the right answer 
depends significantly on a tradeoff between two conflicting goals: minimizing 
the likelihood of judicial error on the one hand, and minimizing the severity of 
judicial error on the other. In Part III, I consider some likely objections to my 
account, including the argument that unintended benefits are better thought of 
as windfalls to be celebrated rather than errors to be avoided. Finally, in Part IV, 
I briefly conclude. 
II.  Justifying Preliminary Relief 
Under the conventional analysis, preliminary relief is appropriate in cases 
where there is an on-going risk of irreparable harm. That is, where a party to 
litigation can show (1) that some harm will continue to accrue during the course 
of litigation and (2) that the harm will be difficult to undo ex post, it is generally 
considered appropriate for the relevant court to issue a remedy early in the 
litigation rather than waiting to craft a remedy only after the merits have been 
definitively adjudicated. The reason is that under these conditions there is a 
tradeoff between accuracy and efficacy. Accuracy is maximized by waiting until 
all the evidence has been presented and all the arguments have been heard. But 
efficacy is maximized by moving quickly, before some part of the outcome has 
been irreversibly predetermined. 
Examples of irreparable harm range across a wide spectrum.11 Some harms are 
literally irreparable in that there is no plausible compensation for the loss. The 
loss of freedom associated with unjust imprisonment might be an example here, 
as might be the loss of companionship with a child or loved one. Other harms 
can be made whole in theory but are irreparable in a particular case. For 
example, the relevant bad actor might lack the necessary funds, or he might have 
the necessary funds but keep them beyond the reach of judicial process. Most 
irreparable harms, however, are irreparable only in the sense that the harm at 
issue is difficult for a court to value.  In these instances, there is some amount of 
cash that would make the relevant victim whole, but the harm is in a practical 
sense irreparable because the court has no way of determining the appropriate 
amount.12 
                                                 
11 Doug Laycock offers a comprehensive taxonomy in Laycock, The Death of the Irreparable 
Injury Rule, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 687 (1990). 
12 See Foundry Services, Inc. v. Beneflux Corp., 206 F2d 214, 216 (2d Cir. 1953) (Hand, J., 
concurring) (“The plaintiff indeed has failed to show any ‘irreparable injury,’ if by that is meant 
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Consider in this light speech harms. Limitations on speech are routinely 
characterized as irreparable, with courts and commentators readily accepting the 
notion that cash cannot adequately make up for speech that is wrongly 
restrained.13 That, however, is ridiculous. A civil rights activist hoping to stage a 
peaceful demonstration on a particular Sunday would often willingly forsake 
that opportunity if compensated by (say) the funding necessary to sponsor ten 
demonstrations the following week, or, better yet, some mixture of 
demonstrations, public hearings, and other means through which his message 
might be heard. The real problem with most speech harms is therefore not that 
after-the-fact cash remedies cannot make the relevant victim whole, but instead 
that courts cannot reliably estimate the size of the necessary cash transfer. 
All this, of course, raises the question of why a harm should be deemed 
irreparable simply because it is difficult for courts to measure reliably. After all, 
in cases like these courts could simply guess at the correct amount of 
compensation. Sometimes the award would be too high. Sometimes the award 
would be too low. But if courts are just as likely to overestimate as they are to 
underestimate, on average the guesses would end up just right. That said, 
preliminary relief is probably better than unadorned guessing for two reasons.14 
First, when faced with uncertainty, courts tend to underestimate harm. This is 
because evidentiary rules are slanted against speculative injuries—plaintiffs 
typically bear the burden of proving any harm with specificity15—and they need 
                                                                                                                                                 
that money will not satisfy any loss that the defendant’s competition will cause; nevertheless it 
has shown such an injury, if that includes the impossibility of ascertaining with any accuracy the 
extent of the loss. That has always been included in its meaning; and I cannot see how the 
plaintiff will ever be able to prove what sales the defendant's competition will make it lose . . . .”); 
MacGinnitie, 420 F.3d at 1242 (injury is irreparable because its value is “difficult, if not 
impossible, to quantify.”). 
13 See, e.g., Bronx Household of Faith v. Board of Ed., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11318 (2002), and 
cases cited therein. See also Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976) ("Loss of First Amendment 
freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.")  
14 In earlier work, I offer some other explanations, but none are as compelling as these two. See 
Lichtman, cited supra note 6, at 201. I should point out that my remarks there are incomplete 
with respect to risk. The real reason that risk is a bad explanation for preliminary relief is that risk 
is itself an injury that can be made whole through some appropriate ex post cash payment. 
15 Among countless examples, see Kids’ Universe v. In2Labs, 95 Cal.App. 4th 870, 883 
(Cal.App. 2002) (“where the operation of an unestablished business is prevented or interrupted, 
damages for prospective profits that might otherwise have been made from its operation are not 
recoverable for the reason that their occurrence is uncertain, contingent and speculative”); Frank 
Music Corp. v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 772 F.2d 505, 513 (“in a copyright action, a trial court 
is entitled to reject a proffered measure of damages if it is too speculative”). 
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to be, or else the courts would be flooded by disingenuous claims. Second, even 
if court estimates were right on average, they would be wrong in particular 
cases, and that might matter tremendously. A plaintiff who can predict that his 
harm will be greater than the average harm, for example, would have an 
incentive to engage in costly self-help precautions. A plaintiff who can predict 
that his harm will be lesser than average, on the other hand, might exercise 
inefficiently little care. And, strategic behavior aside, many plaintiffs would end 
up with the wrong distributional outcomes. That might not be a tragedy, but 
preliminary relief offers another option, and even a quick glance at the caselaw 
confirms that courts routinely take it.16 
My comments thus far focus on irreparable harm, but the basic arguments and 
examples transfer easily to irreparable benefits as well. For instance, if a person 
suffers irreparable harm when imprisoned unjustly, that person experiences an 
irreparable benefit when wrongly allowed to walk free. If a court’s inability to 
enforce its judgments transforms a normal harm into an irreparable one, an 
inability to collect similarly renders irreparable an ill-gotten gain. If the harms 
associated with patent infringement are irreparable because it is hard to cash out 
those harms with precision, so, too, the benefits associated with patent 
infringement can be irreparable in instances where they are hard to accurately 
monetize. Indeed, nothing in my previous discussion turned on the fact that 
those “irreparable harms” were harms. My discussion instead focused on the fact 
that, in each example, the relevant change in status was “irreparable.” That is in 
many ways my central point: it is irreparability that justifies preliminary relief, 
and benefits can be just as irreparable as can harms. 
Does this mean that irreparable harms and irreparable benefits necessarily 
should be given equivalent policy or moral weight? Of course not. The reasons to 
care about the irreparable harm suffered by my hypothetical patent holder, for 
instance, are very different from the reasons to care about the associated 
irreparable benefit enjoyed by the relevant infringer. From an incentive 
                                                 
16 There is a third reason why preliminary injunctions might be an appropriate response in 
cases where an injury is difficult to value: the use of injunctive relief spares the court the expense 
of actually estimating value. Judge Posner rejects this explanation on the ground that any such 
expense would likely be worthwhile. It would only be incurred in litigated cases, but it would 
yield benefits more broadly given how many disputes settle in the shadow of the courts. See 
Richard Posner, Economic Analysis of the Law 35 (7th ed. 2005). I reject this explanation for a 
different reason, namely that it speaks to the wrong issue. Concerns about expense would explain 
why courts might choose to estimate damages rather than trying to calculate them precisely, but 
those concerns do not at all explain why courts should use injunctive relief rather than cheap but 
imperfect estimates. 
 10 
perspective, the harm threatens to in the long run reduce the incentive to develop 
patentable research, whereas the benefit might undermine what would otherwise 
be a strong incentive to invent around the patented invention. Similarly, with 
respect to distributional concerns, irreparable harms might be of greater moral 
concern than are irreparable benefits—which is to say that, under certain 
plausible philosophical views, a government decision that wrongly deprives a 
private party of some right or freedom could reasonably be thought of as being 
of greater consequence than is a similarly errant decision that wrongly 
recognizes that right or freedom. Again, my point is only that irreparable harms 
and irreparable benefits share two core characteristics: they threaten to accrue 
during the pendency of litigation, and they can be relatively difficult to undo ex 
post. These characteristics are what justifies preliminary relief in the first place, 
and thus both irreparable harms and irreparable benefits have relevance when it 
comes to deciding when and whether preliminary relief is appropriate. 
III.  The Standard for Preliminary Relief 
The conventional standard for preliminary relief accounts for three primary 
factors: (1) the likelihood that the requesting party will ultimately prevail on the 
merits; (2) the irreparable harm the requesting party will suffer if the injunction 
is wrongly denied; and (3) the irreparable harm the opposing party will suffer if 
the injunction wrongly issues. The obvious implication of my work is to suggest 
that two more are relevant to the analysis: (4) the irreparable benefit the 
nonmoving party will enjoy if the injunction is wrongly denied; and (5) the 
irreparable benefit the moving party will enjoy in the event of wrongful issuance. 
Taken together, these five considerations would empower a court to estimate not 
only the likelihood of court error but also its severity.  
The question would then become how to weight the factors. Two 
considerations seem dominant. First, particular attention should be paid to the 
court’s prediction on the merits, bluntly because that is the most reliable factor of 
the five in play. Irreparable harms and benefits are by definition difficult to 
quantify.17 Worse, irreparable benefits often interact with irreparable harms in 
                                                 
17 Put differently, when considering a preliminary injunction, the court is uncertain about all 
of the relevant inputs. The court is uncertain about the merits because, by definition, motions for 
preliminary relief are brought early in the litigation process. But the court is also uncertain about 
the relative irreparable implications at stake, primarily because irreparable consequences are 
typically difficult to precisely quantify. I have argued elsewhere that the modern standard for 
preliminary relief focuses so much on the first of these uncertainties that it fails to adequately 
account for the second. See Lichtman, supra note 6. I also suggest some ways by which a court 
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ways that a court cannot easily track. In the patent hypothetical, for instance, the 
main reason to worry about the irreparable harm that threatens the patent holder 
is that this harm would in the long run undermine the incentives created by 
patent protection. The irreparable benefit in play for that same patent holder is 
mainly troubling for the opposite reason: unearned protection would in the long 
run encourage inventors to work on inventions that the patent system itself 
would not protect. For some inventors—say, inventors who are unsure into 
which category their inventions will fall—these long-run consequences cancel 
out. But a court would be hard pressed to armchair this sort of integrated policy-
driven analysis, matching the implications of each irreparable harm to those of 
each irreparable benefit and through that process identifying the net troubling 
effects. This argues against heavy reliance on the four irreparability factors. 
The court’s prediction on the merits, by contrast, seems very reliable. After all, 
courts are well equipped to evaluate legal arguments and parse evidentiary 
records. They also should be relatively good at evaluating more subtle clues like 
the relative quality of the lawyering. Moreover, the result of the preliminary 
hearing often taints the process in ways that make the court’s predicted outcome 
more likely. This is sometimes a psychological effect, as where the judge is 
subconsciously influenced by his earlier decision when he later makes rulings or 
announces jury instructions.18 And it is sometimes just an unavoidable 
ramification of preliminary relief, as where an injunction temporarily entrusts a 
minor to the custody of one of two feuding foster families, the unintended 
consequence being that the minor then strengthens his or her attachment with 
the chosen family, which in turn changes the case on the merits.19 For these 
                                                                                                                                                 
could improve the quality of its estimations, for example by using bonds and after-the-fact 
liability to tease out the parties’ private valuations. Id. at 234. 
18 Similarly, a plaintiff who wins at the preliminary injunction stage might more aggressively 
pursue the litigation, and a defendant who defeats a motion for preliminary relief might more 
aggressively defend. Cf. Jolls, Sunstein & Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 
50 Stan. L. Rev. 1471, 1516-18 (1998) (same point applied to prosecutors). Note that there are 
strategies for minimizing these sorts of psychological biases. For instance, the judge’s 
psychological bias could be rendered irrelevant by scheduling litigation such that one judge 
decides preliminary matters but then a second judge, unaware of the result in the earlier hearing, 
actually hears the case. The cost of this approach would be the obvious lost economy of scale. 
19 See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Pernsley, 693 F. Supp. 318 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (interim placement of 
foster child relevant to final placement decision). Empirical research suggests that many cases 
settle after the issuance of a preliminary injunction but before a full hearing on the merits. Jean 
Lanjouw & Josh Lerner, Tilting the Table? The Use of Preliminary Injunctions, 44 J. Law & Econ. 
573, 576-78 (2001). That finding can be interpreted many ways, but the authors of the study 
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reasons, then, a court should likely put more weight on its prediction with 
respect to the merits than it does on its estimates of the various irreparable 
consequences. 
The second consideration that should influence the relative weight of these 
five preliminary injunction factors is the extent to which it is important to 
minimize the number of court errors as opposed to minimizing their average 
severity. The best way to minimize the number of errors is to focus exclusively 
on the court’s prediction as to the likely outcome on the merits. Indeed, by 
granting relief in any case where the moving party is more likely than not to win 
on the merits, a court can maximize the likelihood that its preliminary decision 
will be consistent with its final ruling. After all, if the moving party is more likely 
to win than to lose, in most cases he will win, and thus granting the injunction is 
the safest bet. Some errors, however, are more troubling than others; and the 
only way to incorporate that idea is to consider in addition the irreparable harms 
and benefits associated with each type of error. That will increase the likelihood 
of error because the results will sometimes conflict with the simple more-likely-
than-not rule. Ideally, however, those more numerous errors will on average be 
less severe, because the court will be able to identify and avoid the most serious 
threats. 
This tradeoff between accuracy and severity knows no general solution. Even 
in the simplest case where only distributional issues are at stake, reasonable 
minds might disagree over whether it is better to have (a) four cases decided 
correctly but one horribly off or (b) two cases decided correctly but the 
remaining three only modestly in error. Cases where incentives are a concern 
complicate the problem, with the analysis now depending on what behaviors are 
at stake and how sensitive private parties are to the various errant payoffs. The 
fact that a court has only a limited ability to measure irreparable repercussions is 
also relevant here. In the extreme, a court’s estimates might be so poor that 
incorporating them will increase the error rate but not offer much of a 
corresponding decrease in error severity. Lastly, if I am right in my claim above 
that decisions with respect to preliminary relief sometimes taint the outcome 
after a full hearing on the merits, that itself is a reason to encourage courts to 
emphasize accuracy and downplay severity. That way, if a little bias is inevitable, 
at least it will push in the right direction. 
                                                                                                                                                 
interpret it as evidence for the proposition that preliminary injunctions significantly alter the 
parties’ relative positions in the litigation. Id. 
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IV. Objections 
My account of preliminary relief in general and irreparable benefits in 
particular can be subject to a host of intuitive criticisms. Some of those are 
entirely on point. Others misconstrue the idea or its implications. All help, 
however, to further delineate the precise contours of my argument and to 
unpack its relationship to other literatures and debates. 
Start with the most obvious criticism, namely that I am wrong here to 
characterize unintentional benefits as errors. According to this argument, to the 
extent that a preliminary injunction confers a benefit on one party without 
imposing an equivalent harm on the other, the result is a windfall that courts 
should ignore and perhaps even celebrate. I hear the intuition here, but I think 
the objection is misplaced, in that it incorrectly assumes that private benefits are 
also social benefits. Return to my patent hypothetical. If the patentee is 
mistakenly awarded preliminary relief, the patentee is admittedly privately 
better off. But it would be surprising were society to applaud that error. Patent 
law meant to award this patentee a certain payoff, a payoff designed to create 
particular incentives with respect to the patentee’s behavior and to achieve a 
given distributional outcome as a reflection of the patentee’s contributions to 
social welfare. Any deviation from that baseline distorts those incentives and 
undermines the desired distributional outcome. The labels “harm” and “benefit” 
thus mislead, emphasizing the private party perspective but neglecting broader 
social goals and consequences.20 
A second intuitive criticism is that the irreparable harm at stake for a party in 
the litigation will typically be comparable in magnitude to the irreparable benefit 
at stake for that same party, and thus there is no reason to account for both. In 
my patent hypothetical, for instance, the irreparable harm at risk for the patentee 
is the irreparable harm associated with any unlawful infringement that might 
occur between the rejection of the motion for preliminary relief and the final 
resolution of the case on the merits. The irreparable benefit at stake, meanwhile, 
is the irreparable benefit associated with wrongful enforcement of the patent for 
that same time period. These magnitudes are indeed comparable in a superficial 
                                                 
20 I am obviously not the first to argue that unintended private benefits can be socially 
harmful. The literature on restitution develops this point, and courts widely accept it under 
theories like the theory of unjust enrichment. For discussion of when and why substantive legal 
rules disgorge unearned benefits even in the absence of a parallel undeserved harm, see E. Allan 
Farnsworth, Your Loss or My Gain? The Dilemma of the Disgorgement Principle in Breach of 
Contract, 94 Yale L. J. 1339 (1984); Douglas Laycock, The Scope and Significance of Restitution, 67 
Tex. L. Rev. 1277 (1988); Saul Levmore & William J. Stuntz, Remedies and Incentives in Private 
and Public Law: A Comparative Essay, 1990 Wis. L. Rev. 483 (1990). 
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sense, but for three reasons equivalence here is an illusion. First, as I have 
stressed already, even if the magnitudes of two considerations are similar, their 
distributional and incentive implications will often differ substantially. Second, 
these two irreparable consequences might be irreparable to different degrees. 
Sales forsaken, for instance, are hard to measure because it is difficult to run the 
necessary counterfactual. Sales unlawfully made, by contrast, can often be easily 
disgorged, namely by taking away the tainted cash.21 Third and finally, note that 
these superficially equivalent factors argue in entirely opposite directions. The 
possibility of that irreparable harm is a reason to issue the injunction, whereas 
the possibility of that irreparable benefit is a reason to deny it. Accounting for the 
irreparable harm therefore does not implicitly account for the irreparable benefit. 
A third and related criticism emphasizes another form of possible equivalence: 
equivalence between the irreparable harm at stake for one party and the 
irreparable benefit in play for the other. Equivalence of this sort is common in 
disputes involving fungible goods. In a dispute over twenty dollars, that which 
one party gains from a wrongful win exactly corresponds to that which the other 
party loses. For harms and benefits that are irreparable, by contrast, equivalence 
seems unlikely to hold. In the patent hypothetical, for instance, the irreparable 
benefit associated with an errant injunction is the benefit that the patent holder 
derives from several months of undeserved protection. The irreparable harm, 
meanwhile, is the loss that the accused infringer suffers during that same time 
period. Are these two effects equivalent? Maybe, but maybe not. Much depends 
on how central the relevant research is to each firm’s plans, what each firm’s 
next-best research options look like, and dozens of other party-specific factors. 
A fourth intuitive criticism is the argument that in one way or another my 
concerns here are already being addressed. This criticism can take many forms. 
For instance, courts do from time to time recognize that a given party might 
wrongfully benefit if the injunction at issue is either denied or granted.22 And 
                                                 
21 Then again, if the product is an automobile and the infringement involves only a feature on 
the rearview mirror, valuation problems return because the court likely has no reliable way of 
disentangling the value of the infringement from the value of the rest of the car. Cf. Sheldon v. 
Metro-Goldwyn Pictures, 106 F.2d 45  (2d Cir. 1939) (dispute over whether the extent to which 
the value of a movie derived from the movie script, which infringed copyright, as opposed to 
other factors like the identity of the leading actress or the advertising budget of the film). 
22 I have hunted for opinions where the court in some way refers to irreparable benefits, but I 
have found only a tiny handful, and in even those cases the relevant court’s reference to 
irreparable benefits is ambiguous to say the least. An example is Perfect 10 v. Cybernet Ventures, 
Inc., 213 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1191 (C.D. Cal 2002), where the court notes in passing that the accused 
infringer “profits from the infringing and unlawful activities” but does not seem to have any 
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there are many jurisdictions where, in addition to the standard factors, courts 
evaluating a motion for preliminary relief explicitly consider whether “the public 
interest” would be served by granting the injunction23—an amorphous inquiry 
surely capable of including in its purview the many considerations I raise here. 
To this, my response is that even if courts do on occasion stumble into these 
intuitions, and even if certain articulations of the modern standard could be read 
to incorporate the concerns I raise here, it still is both troubling and puzzling that 
irreparable benefits are left to so haphazard and imperfect a safety net, whereas 
irreparable harms are uniformly and explicitly considered in every jurisdiction. 
As I have argued here, irreparable harms and benefits are factors of comparable 
importance. If courts are to be verbally reminded to consider irreparable harm as 
they weigh the pros and cons of injunctive relief, they should with similar force 
be reminded to weigh irreparable benefits. 
A fifth and final intuitive criticism is that my thesis is too timid; if irreparable 
benefits have relevance for preliminary injunctions, they should be relevant 
when courts consider permanent injunctive relief as well. On this, I disagree. The 
reason is that decisions with respect to permanent relief are made entirely with 
an eye to the merits. That is, when evaluating a motion for injunctive relief, a 
court does not factor in the possibility that its final decision on the merits might 
be wrong. Instead, the court takes its final decision as a given and merely decides 
whether injunctive relief is among the types of remedies available under the 
relevant substantive law.24 This is in sharp contrast to the analysis relevant to 
preliminary relief, where, as I have emphasized, the decision turns not only on 
the merits but also on the likelihood and magnitude of court error. Because of 
this difference, the concept of “irreparable benefits” is in my view of little import 
as applied to permanent relief. There is no reason to measure the consequences 
of error precisely; error costs are not a factor when it comes to permanent relief. 
                                                                                                                                                 
sense of how that point relates to the other considerations at issue. That said, for the purposes of 
argument, I assume in the text that opinions like this exist, and I am meanwhile continuing to 
search for them. 
23 For citations and discussion, see Thomas R. Lee, Preliminary Injunctions and the Status 
Quo, 58 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 109, 111 (2001) (citing cases). 
24 For explanations and criticisms of the practice, see David Kaye, The Limits of the 
Preponderance of Evidence Standard: Justifiably Naked Statistical Evidence and Multiple 
Causation, 1982 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 487; Steven Shavell, Uncertainty over Causation and the 
Determination of Civil Liability, 28 J. L. & Econ. 587 (1985); Joshua P. Davis, Taking Uncertainty 
Seriously: Revising Injunction Doctrine, 34 Rutgers L.J. 363 (2003). 
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V. Conclusion 
When considering a motion for preliminary relief, courts in every circuit take 
careful account of any harm that might accrue during the course of litigation but 
be difficult to undo ex post. In this Essay, I have urged that attention likewise be 
paid to benefits that might similarly accrue during the course of litigation and 
similarly be difficult to counteract. I would do so by introducing two additional 
considerations to the conventional analysis. Courts would be asked to consider 
the irreparable benefit enjoyed by the moving party in the event of errant 
issuance and the irreparable benefit enjoyed by the non-moving party in the 
event of an errant denial. That would admittedly complicate the analysis. 
However, the current approach simplifies things in an indefensible way. The 
very incentive and distributional concerns that justify the modern focus on 
irreparable harm similarly require judicial consideration of irreparable benefits. 
  
 
